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exeCUtive SUMMAry1
Crafting a university governance system that ensures university autonomy and faculty participation in the 
university governance is the urgent problem that the Mongolian 
state-run universities face. Thus, having identified a shared 
governance system of university as the best system that 
ensures both university autonomy and faculty participation 
in university governance after reviewing relevant literatures, 
this paper (1) identifies deficiencies of the existing university 
governance system by analyzing relevant legal documents and 
findings of interviews and observations, and (2) advances policy 
recommendations as to how to rectify the current system. 
In this study, while the autonomy of the university is 
understood as the ability of the university to determine its policy 
and govern itself effectively without any political, religious and 
other factional interferences, the faculty participation in the 
university governance is understood as the institutionalised and 
autonomous participation of the faculty in the decision making 
of the university’s academic matter.   
By the mid 1990s, Mongolia has adopted a form of university 
governance which can be said as closer to that of the United 
1 I would like to thank Dr. J. Sukhbaatar and Bill Weary for their invaluable advises 
and comments on the earlier draft of the paper. My thanks extend to the people 
who provided constructive comments during mid-term presentation of research 
findings. Also, I would like to thank A. Gerelmaa for her scrupulous editing of the 
draft paper.  
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States and Canada in order to make its state-run universities 
autonomous and self-sufficient.  Nonetheless, the adopted 
system, because of some initial oversights and subsequent 
policy inconsistency, did not bring the desired outcome. As a 
result, neither are Mongolian state universities autonomous of 
partisan politics nor are they capable of pursuing preeminence. 
While university governing boards have not only been tied 
to government but also been effectively negated, academic 
councils of the universities have seriously been deformed.  On 
the other hand, university administration has directly been put 
under the control of the government.  Furthermore, because 
of virtual negation of university governing boards and serious 
deformation of academic councils, there has been created a 
power vacuum on both sides of the university administrations. 
This power vacuum creates a situation where transparency, 
responsiveness and accountability of university administrations 
lack.    
Most stakeholders are aware of this situation, thus, they suggest 
changing the system by way of (1) granting public statuses to 
state-run universities by special law, or (2) granting a complete 
control of university to faculty members or (3) contracting 
out university administration to a management team on a 
competitive basis. However, the evaluation of the options 
shows that neither the faculty complete control of university 
nor the contracting out of university administration is not only 
conducive but also feasible to address the problems.  While 
granting public status to universities is the best solution to 
ensure university autonomy, increasing faculty participation 
in university governance will not only strengthen university 
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autonomy but also enhance the transparency and accountability 
of the university administration.  
Thus, the best solution to the problems that plaque the 
governance of the Mongolian state-run universities is to re-
institute once introduced shared governance system with its 
proper institutions, authorities, and procedures. Otherwise, 
rectifying the existing governance system is the best option 
to ensure university autonomy and faculty participation in 
university governance.  
In order to make the shared governance system workable it is 
advisable to make the university boards public and governing 
institutions. Furthermore, the board has to be sufficiently 
institutionalized and relevant institutional culture has to be 
fostered too. 
On the other hand, existing academic councils of the state-run 
universities should be separated from the administrations of 
the universities and they should form independent faculty 
governance bodies composed of faculty.  Furthermore, academic 
councils should be given full authority over academic matters 
and advisory and consultative authority over other matters of 
the university.  In addition, adequate institutionalization and 
fostering of relevant culture are needed in the establishment of 
efficient academic councils.
In fact, every effort should be made to establish and foster 
shared governance system in Mongolian universities if 
Mongolian universities are to pursue educational excellence and 
preeminence ever, thus serving the public better.
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iNtroDUCtioN 
Since the 1990s Mongolia has embarked a policy of decentralization of its higher education. The policy aimed 
at building autonomous and self-sufficient higher education 
institutions. Thus, by the mid-1990s, Mongolia has adopted 
university governance system similar to that of the United 
States. 
Nonetheless, the adopted system, because of some serious 
oversights on the adopters’ side and, subsequent, policy 
inconsistency, did not bring the desired outcome. The 
university governing boards have effectively been negated 
and what remains of them remains completely dependent on 
partisan politics, because the majority of the board members 
are government appointed politicians. On the other hand, 
institutions of academic self-governance, an essential part of the 
shared governance system, remain underdeveloped or seriously 
deformed. The university administration, since the president of 
the university is appointed by the minister and accountable to 
the minister, is highly susceptible to partisan politics. 
Furthermore, the virtual negation of governing boards and 
the serious deformation of the institutions of academic self-
governance yield power vacuums on the both side of the 
administration. This not only entails power concentration 
at the hand of the administration but also produces less 
transparent and less responsive administration. In addition, 
reforming state UNiverSity governance
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because of thoughtless distribution of power and function, the 
university governance institutions, especially, the board and 
the administration have been forced to engage conflict prone 
relations. 
Consequently, governance of Mongolian state-run universities 
is, unfortunately, in a critical situation: neither are Mongolian 
public universities autonomous of partisan politics nor are 
they capable of pursuing preeminence. For instance, not only 
are the state universities in no position to wrestle with the 
government in enforcing the Educational Law that entitles them 
public funding (article 40) but also incapable of increasing their 
tuition fees. As a result, having been rejected from the most 
important sources for the improvement of institutional quality 
the universities have lost their competitiveness in recruiting 
and retaining the best minds of the country. They also are in no 
position to improve their academic and cultural environments. 
Consequently, the quality of the education, research and service 
offered by the universities has been watered down since the 
1990s. 
Thus, crafting an autonomous and transparent university 
governance system is an urgent problem if Mongolian state-
run universities are to pursue educational excellence and 
preeminence ever, thus serving the public better. In view of this 
situation, this paper identifies the deficiencies of the existing 
governance system, and offers policy recommendations to 
rectify the system deficiencies.  
After a comprehensive review on the existing best practice 
of university governance, the research analyzes relevant 
legal documents relevant on Mongolian state-run university 
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governance. In addition, the research uses the data collected 
through interviews and observations. For the sake of efficiency 
the research selected the National University of Mongolia as a 
case, thus, the results of the research might not be generalizable 
to other higher education institutions, especially, to the ones that 
emphasize on knowledge dissemination only. However, it is 
my belief that the results of the research are applicable to other 
comprehensive universities like Mongolian University of Science 
and Technology etc. 
The main focus of the research was on the governing board of the 
university. However, treating the governing board in isolation 
from the faculty participation in the university governance, and 
the administration was inadequate for these three are closely 
interrelated and without an adequate understanding of their 
interrelation university governance cannot be fully captured. 
Thus the research also covers the faculty participation in the 
university governance and the administration however it might 
seem bit sketchy for the analysis on these important parts of the 
university governance based only on manifest findings. 
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2. PoliCy iNCoNSiSteNCy iN StAte UNiverSity 
GoverNANCe
With the democratization of the country Mongolia started a comprehensive reform in its higher education 
governance since early 1990s. The reform was basically that 
of decentralization: less state control more autonomy and 
self-governance of the higher education institutions. For this 
end, the government has tried different approaches including 
establishment of governing boards, privatization of management 
and privatization. 
Yet, the reform has been highly inconsistent. Within this rather 
short time span Mongolia has changed its educational and 
higher educational laws six times (1991, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 
and 2006), and each time the governance system of higher 
education institutions were affected. Initially, 1995 educational 
and higher educational laws introduced a governing board but 
with advisory and screening function (Educational Law article 
13, 30, Higher Education Law article 13.7) into Mongolian 
higher education institutions, yet, government still retained the 
authority to select university presidents (Educational law article 
13; Higher Educational Law article 12). The law also introduced 
an advisory body, academic council, (Higher Education Law 
article13.5, 13.6) on academic matters consisting of faculty 
members. According to the law, presidents of universities were 
to authorize the bylaw and composition of this body. Thus, 
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the seeds of the shared governance system were installed in 
Mongolian higher education. 
Then, 1998 chances to educational (article 30), and higher 
educational law (article 13) strengthened university autonomy 
further. The changes granted the authority to appoint and 
dismiss university president to the governing board thus 
the university governing board become a governing board 
by definition. However, it was reversed in 2002, when the 
authority to appoint and dismiss presidents of the universities 
was concentrated at the hand of the government. Yet, it did not 
dissolve the governing boards of the universities which expected 
to fulfill the duties other than the appointment and dismissal of 
the presidents of the universities (combination of two systems). 
Because of this conflicting policy, now, the initial objective 
to strengthen the autonomy and self-governance of the state 
higher education institutions has effectively been cancelled. 
Theoretically, the state-run universities did not achieve any 
autonomy and self-governance. Instead, they are now put under 
dual control of the government in the face of the minister of 
education and the governing board majority of which are the 
government appointed politicians.
2.1 NeGAteD GoverNiNG BoArD
The governing boards of Mongolian state-run universities 
are governing board in name only. They lack the necessary 
authority, autonomy and continuity. Furthermore, they suffer 
under-institutionalization and inadequate institutional culture. 
Thus, they have effectively been negated.  
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Lack of Authority
By definition, a governing board is the board that exercises the 
authority to appoint, review, evaluate and dismiss the executive 
of an institution2. However, the 2002 Educational law, by 
delegating the power to appoint and dismiss the president of the 
university to the minister of the education, effectively negated 
the university governing board; however it did not alter the 
name of the board (Educational law 28.1.12; Higher education 
law 11.3).3 Accordingly, the university governing board’s 
authority and duty, consequently its relation with the university 
administration has fundamentally been altered. The nature of 
the board and administration relation has become transactional 
but not hierarchical.  
Furthermore, the existing dual and rather ambiguous 
governance structure puts the university governing board 
into uneasy relations with the university administration. 
The university board’s main duty4 is to review and evaluate 
university annual report, to approve its budget and to set its 
tuition fee. This always entails conflict between the board and 
the administration because the administration’s aim is to defend 
its proposed budget and tuition fee and the board’s duty is 
to review it. Thus, the board has become an reviewing and 
screening body since it approves the university long-range plan, 
2 The main authorities and duties of the university governing board is “(1) to select 
and support the president; (2) to formulate and pursue the institution’s mission 
and purposes; (3) to oversee the educational program; (4) to nurture the institu-
tion’s tangible assets; and (5) to care for the institution’s intangible assets, espe-
cially academic freedom, the commitment to excellence and impartiality, and its 
ethical standards (Freedman 2004: 16). 
3 Also, the Law of Management and Financing of Fiscal Institutions enforces this 
situation.  
4  It also approves the university long-range plan etc (Educational Law 36.11). 
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budget, and sets the tuition fee, and reviews and evaluates the 
executive’s performance (Educational Law, 36.11.1-36.12). 
Lack of Autonomy 
In any democratic country “partisan politics – the politics of 
party and interest – is pursued with great passion”. Thus one 
of the central questions of university governance “has been 
to what extent it is either desirable or possible to insulate any 
public institution from the influence of party politics”5 (Trow 
267). And the devising of public boards to govern universities 
was one of the fundamental mechanisms to assure university 
autonomy, that is, its capacity to direct its own affairs. Thus, one 
of the hallmarks of the university governing board rests on its 
autonomy of partisan politics. And, university governing board 
has to be devised in line with this overarching principle. 
According to the Educational Law, the university governing 
boards consist of the representatives of the founder of the 
given university, faculty, alumni, and student body. The 
representatives of the founder should make up 51-60 percent 
of the board thus the law secures permanent majority to the 
founder (Educational Law 36.2). For instance, in May 11, 2007, 
ten out of eighteen members of the Governing Board of the 
National University of Mongolia were the representatives of the 
founder of the university. 
In the case of the state-run universities, the government of 
Mongolia is understood as the founder and the minister of 
education represents the government, however, the educational 
law does not explicitly say who the founder of the state-
5 Creating a civil service and treating faculty members as civil servants is the way 
that most European countries devised.  
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run universities is. The minister of education appoints all 
the representatives of the government who are government 
officials consisting of political electives and appointees. The 
political appointees are basically ex officio members because 
their membership in board tied to their governmental posts; 
however, they are not explicitly ex officio. For instance, while in 
2003, five parliamentarians, and four appointed officials were 
representing the government of Mongolia at the Governing 
Board of the National University of Mongolia and by 2007 one 
parliamentarian, 8 appointed officials replaced them. 
Since the governmental representatives make up the majority 
of the board they are the chief decision makers at state-run 
university governing boards. Thus they are the chief decision 
makers at the board. Indeed, because of their power and prestige 
the government representatives basically dominate the meeting 
of the board. Yet, this crucial fraction of the board is not only 
completely dependent on politics but also dependent on political 
contingency in terms of its selection and period of service as we 
will see below. 
Because of its complete dependence on politics, the board 
basically conforms to the politics of the day. The elected 
members of the board have to keep their political promises, 
which runs against the increase of tuitions and fees, for instance. 
Consequently, it is in their interest to keep student tuitions and 
fees as low as possible. The appointees basically follow whatever 
the government of the day decides.  
This practice, exactly, contravenes to the idea of making the 
university board autonomous of political influence, thus 
guarding the autonomy of the university. Instead, it ties 
reforming state UNiverSity governance
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the university to politics closely. Thus, Mongolian state-run 
university board is not an apolitical public body that defends 
the university from the possible political influences. The boards 
instead of buffering the university from various political forces 
have become conduits for political issues beyond the campus 
(Duderstadt 2004: 143) Consequently, Mongolian state-run 
university governing board is, certainly, not the university’s 
self-governing body, as it says in the Educational law, but a 
quasi-governmental body that oversees the university under 
the minister of education. Thus, the university people see the 
governing board as “another clout” of the government, as one 
representative of a university administration says. Consequently, 
the university administration tends to keep distance from its 
board.
Lack of Continuity   
The term of the service in the board is staggered 3 years for 
all board members so that one third of the members has to be 
renewed each year. It, obviously designed to ensure both the 
continuity and change of the board. However, the governmental 
representatives’ membership in the board rarely comply with 
their legally prescribed term of 3 years because the appointment 
of the government representatives is very much dependent on 
politics and, it seems, no one pays much attention in enforcing 
the law.6  
Usually, major changes among the representatives of the 
government occur either with the general election or with 
change of the minister of education. Thus, for instance, in the 
case of the National University of Mongolia, after 2000 (8 out 
6  Same is true to other members of the board.
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of 9) and 2004 (7 out of 9) general elections the government 
representatives of the board had completely been changed. And, 
the government representatives that came after 2000 election 
served interruptedly for 4 years. Furthermore, the government 
representatives tend to be changed with the appointment 
of new minister of education. Thus, eighty percent of the 
government representatives who were appointed in May, 2005 
have been dismissed in May, 2007.  In addition, whenever the 
appointed officials leave their government posts they also give 
up their membership in the board automatically. For instance, 3 
members of the government representatives appointed in 2005 
have been changed in 2006. Thus, to make the bad situation 
worse, the board lacks continuity. Discontinuity is a disruption 
of the board. As a result, the board has turned out to be an ad 
hoc committee but not a permanent and evolving institution. 
Because of this, the board’s working capacity has greatly been 
reduced and in fact, the board lacks the necessary conditions to 
discharge its duties. Not only the board has to be permanent and 
continuous but also the individual board members have to have 
enough time to acquire the necessary knowledge, expertise and 
experience in order to effectively discharge their duties. 
Under-Institutionalization 
Any organization has to have a proper institutional or 
organizational arrangement in order to achieve its missions 
and objectives and discharge its duties both efficiently and 
effectively. The institutionalization provides a framework 
of action and interaction and it channels ambitions into 
specific functions. Thus, adequate institutionalization is 
essential to board. Consequently, boards have developed its 
own institutional framework including leadership, bylaw, 
reforming state UNiverSity governance
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manual, and various organizational forms to carry out its 
duties. Certainly, Mongolian state-run university boards have 
their chairman, secretary and bylaw. A board meeting is the 
basic organizational form that a Mongolian university board 
discharges its duties and it meets no less than 2 times a year. 
In addition, commission and working (or task) group can be 
established to assist the board in carrying out its activities.  
However, in practice, university governing boards in Mongolia 
suffer under-institutionalization. In the case of the National 
University of Mongolia, the board barely meets twice a year 
whilst its American counterparts meet 7.4 times a year in average 
(Kaplan 2004: 186)7. The board has no schedule or plan of work 
to carry out its business. And the board rarely meets its initially 
convened date; postponing of the meeting is commonplace. 
One of the most efficient way to organize business of the 
board is to have various standing8, coordinating and special 
committees so that “they provide the opportunity to make 
needed investigations and clarify policy; to use the special 
talents of board members in a focused fashion; to carry out 
essential functions that do not require the time of the full board; 
to aid in the involvement of individuals; to help train board 
members for positions of responsibility; to strengthen weak 
board officers; to speed up decisions; to permit the discussion 
of confidential matters not appropriate with the whole board; to 
give recognition to board members; and to proclaim the board’s 
interest in a certain subject or field of work” (Houle 1997: 81). 
7 The author has been told that governing boards of some of Mongolian higher edu-
cation institutions rarely meet. 
8 Program, personnel policy, nominations, buildings and grounds, investment, and 
budget committees are most prevalent standing committees of a university board 
(See, Houle 1997). 
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However, this important organizational feature is virtually 
absent in the boards of Mongolian state-run universities. For 
instance, the Governing board of the National University of 
Mongolia has never established any committee to discharge its 
duties throughout its existence. Therefore, the board lacks the 
necessary channels to efficiently carry out its duties. 
Lack of Institutional Culture 
Finally, human potential of the board is paramount for the 
board to discharge its duties efficiently and effectively. “Neither 
the selection of the board members nor the increase of their 
knowledge should be left to chance” (Houle 1997: 58) Personal 
attributes, the future board members should possess, like 
“commitment to the importance of the service or function with 
which the new board is to be concerned, a respected position 
in the community, intelligence, courage, capacity for personal 
growth, the ability to influence public opinion among significant 
sectors of the community, willingness to serve, and readiness to 
work with others” (Houle 1997: 28-29) has to be taken seriously 
in the selection of the board members. Furthermore, every board 
has to have means to continuously educate its new members 
such as giving orientation and providing board manual etc9. 
All of these are virtually non-existent in Mongolia. The majority 
of the boards are contingent political electives or appointees. In 
fact, there is no clearly spelled out procedures as to how to select 
the board members who represent the government. The most of 
the board members are appointed either on the basis of political 
9 One prominent board chair flatly rejects the idea of giving orientations to new 
board members and educating them subsequently on the ground that any board 
member should have all the necessary knowledge and expertise at the time of se-
lection. 
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calculation or on the basis of ex officio. Thus, the selection of the 
government representative members of the board is not only not 
transparent but also very much contingent and arbitrary. 
The government representative members of the board show little 
or no commitment to the university development. Instead, they 
pursue their own political or personal agendas without concern 
for the welfare of the institution or its service to broader society. 
In fact, the university board makes no significant attempt 
to develop the university. For instance, the board members 
who represent the government, instead of trying to secure 
various funding for university including state appropriation 
for university, tries to keep student tuition and fees as low as 
possible, currently the only source of funding of the universities. 
Thus, in effect, the boards’ attitude is at least not supportive of 
the university. In fact, the board lacks necessary institutional 
culture10.
On the other hand, understandably, the university 
administration, instead of collaborating with the board, 
approaches it with distrust, and tends to keep it at arms length. 
The university administration basically sees the board as an 
idle, yet, noisy institution11. All in all, the university board 
is very much alienated from the university administration, 
consequently, from the university. Thus, in effect, there has been 
created a power vacuum at board level12. 
10 Board manual and the idea of providing orientation and continuous education of 
board members is non existent in Mongolia. 
11 In fact, the board is very much politicized institutions due to its composition and 
representative characteristics. 
12 Furthermore, in current political instability that forces the minister of education 
resign quite often the minister lacks the ability to keep the university administra-
tion accountable. Thus the power vacuum is present at ministerial level too.   
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2.2 ACADeMiC CoUNCil: AN eMBryoNiC FACUlty SeNAte
One of the essential parts of shared governance system is faculty 
participation in the university governance. And the faculty 
senate is the most important institution of faculty involvement 
in the university governance13. Academic Councils of Mongolian 
higher education institutions, an advisory body, can roughly be 
identified as a local version of faculty senate; however, it is not 
always the case. 
The Academic Council of the National University of Mongolia 
is one, perhaps, the best case in Mongolia. Yet this institution is 
not only completely dependent on the university administration 
but also under-institutionalized. The president of the university, 
who is the chairman of this institution, authorizes the bylaw and 
membership of the Academic Council and serves as its speaker. 
The president appoints the secretary of the council, the only 
officer of the council except the president, and currently one of 
the vice-presidents of the university occupies this post. The senior 
administrators (the president, the vice-presidents and the deans) 
make up almost the third of the council. In effect, the university 
administration completely dominates the Academic Council. 
In addition, most of the department chairs, who were appointed 
by the president of the university, sit in the Academic Council. 
Thus, in fact, the Academic Council looks like an extended 
13 In academic matters like criteria for student admissions, faculty hiring and promo-
tion, curriculum development, and awarding degrees faculty exercises decision 
making authority. And these academic matters decided at various faculty commit-
tees (promotion, curriculum, and executive) typically at the department, school, or 
college level. In non-academic matters of the university faculty has advisory and 
consultative authority. This form of faculty governance occurs at the university 
level and usually involves an elected body of faculty representatives, such as an 
academic senate, that serves to debate institution-wide issues and advise the uni-
versity administration (Duderstadt 2004: 140-1).
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meeting of the university administration. Furthermore, because 
the bylaw of the Academic Council requires “prestigious 
scholars” to be the member of this body, old professors make 
up the great majority of the council14. Because of its composition 
and its complete dependency on the university administration 
the Academic Council never constitute independent forum 
of meaningful debate and constructive discussion. Thus 
the institution turns out to be an auxiliary to the university 
administration body. 
In fact, many members of this institution see the Academic 
Council as a ceremonial body and its meeting as a waste of time. 
In fact, apathy and lack of understanding of university affair are 
important barriers to meaningful faculty participation, which 
is caused by a chronic shortage of information and knowledge 
about how university really works. 
The basic organizational form that the Academic Council 
discharges its duty is its meeting, which convenes usually 
twice a year. The Academic Council, like the governing board, 
has no other organizational form to discharge its duties: it has 
no schedule or work plan, no office, no manual, no executive, 
coordinating or standing committees. And it rarely sets up 
special committee or commission. 
Thus, it can be argued that a faculty senate as such virtually 
does not exist in Mongolian universities. Furthermore, 
admission, promotion, curriculum, and executive committees, 
which operate at the departmental and school level, are virtually 
non-existent in Mongolian universities. Therefore, faculty 
14 As of this year only 5 out of 71 members of the Academic Council are under 40 
years of age. 
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involvement in university governance is very limited. Indeed, 
there is no institutionalized body that keeps the administration 
accountable and responsive to the faculty. Thus, the idea of 
faculty participation in the governance of the university is in its 
embryonic stage. It again creates a power vacuum on the side of 
the faculty.  
2.3 ADMiNiStrAtioN: PoWer CoNCeNtrAtioN AND lACK 
oF trANSPAreNCy 
As it has been discussed earlier, university presidents are 
appointed by the minister of education and accountable to the 
minister. Theoretically, therefore, the president of the university, 
consequently the university administration, is very susceptible 
to partisan politics. In fact, in the case of the National University 
of Mongolia, not only the current president’s appointment was 
clearly politically motivated but also his retainment of the office 
can be attributed to his newly converted political allegiance15. 
Otherwise, because of its susceptibility to partisan politics the 
president of the university is forced to seek some degree of 
political patronage among the politicians in order to maintain 
his office.  
Furthermore, it is the president of the university who appoints 
all the administrative and academic officers of the university 
including vice-presidents, deans, and even chairs of the 
departments. In addition, as it has been discussed earlier, the 
president of the university is the chairman of the Academic 
15 The current president of the National University of Mongolia, Ts. Gantsog, was ap-
pointed by the Democratic Union Block government even though he lost the uni-
versity wide election to incumbent D. Dorj, a member of MPRP, then the main op-
position, by 27:34 percent. Yet, Mr. Ts. Gantsog saw it necessary to join the MPRP 
after its landslide victory in 2000 election.   
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Council of the university and he/she authorizes its bylaw 
and membership. Thus, not only all the academic and non-
academic administrators of the university but also the university 
Academic Council serve at the discretion of the president16. This 
unusual power concentration not only violates the hierarchical 
delegation of authority and accountability but also result in 
rather opaque administration.
This creates a condition where arbitrariness and cronyism 
can develop. In fact, in the case of the National University of 
Mongolia, during 1998-2002 eight of nine senior and important 
positions of the university had been filled by physicists, except 
the vice-president of finance and economics, including two vice-
presidents, and chiefs of the academic affairs, foreign relations, 
and maintenance etc17. To date the legacy of this pattern 
continues, however it has been rectified to so some extent18. 
Because of power concentration at the top, the mid level 
administrators, especially, deans, find it very difficult to keep 
department chairs accountable. In fact, they find themselves 
essentially in a position of intermediaries who transmit decisions 
made at top level to down. This contributes to the opaqueness 
of the administration and creates accountability disorder: it is 
difficult to determine who is accountable for bad decision.  
    
16 This means, theoretically, partisan politics is penetrable to ivory towers to its aca-
demic core, the departments. 
17 The president himself is a physicist. One of the vice-presidents was a mathemati-
cian; however, physics and math had long been under one faculty.  
18 It is said that the Dean of the School of Social Science has publicly reproached by 
saying that the president has to appoint another physicist as a dean of the School 
of Social Sciences when he gives up his position.  
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Furthermore, the power vacuum created on the both sides of the 
administration enforces this situation, thus, in effect the control 
of the university had fallen into the hands of an administrative 
group of senior officials who, in fact, ran the university without 
any genuine accountability. Many faculty members and lay 
people including politicians express the concern that in some 
cases these administrators, who enjoy powerful political 
patronage, ran the university as though it were their own private 
establishment by effectively displacing the governing boards 
and the academic councils. 
All in all, in effect, the existing arrangement effectively negates 
the governing board and the academic council, the two 
chambers/pillars of university governance, and concentrates 
the power at the hand of few senior administrators who are 
very susceptible to partisan politics for their retainment of 
office, who, thus, conform with the politics of the day instead of 
defending and advancing the university interests.
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3. tHe BeSt oPtioN: PUBliC StAtUS AND SHAreD 
GoverNANCe SySteM
Mongolian state-run universities need an autonomous and transparent governance system. While the autonomy of 
the governance will not only keep the partisan politics out of 
the universities, which is one of the prerequisites of academic 
freedom, but also endow university governors with the capacity 
to direct the university affairs and defend university interest, 
that is, the interest of the academic community, effectively. At 
the same time, the transparency and accountability will ensure 
that the university and its administration manage the university 
recourses efficiently and effectively so that the university 
achieves its missions and goals, thus serving the public better. 
In effect, Mongolian universities need a transparent shell19 that 
serves better to the interest of the university, thus, the public at 
large. 
And, not surprisingly, all of the direct stakeholders involved, 
that is, policy-makers, university administrators, faculty 
members and students who are immediately affected by the 
university performance, recognize these needs; however, their 
suggested options to address the problem differ. (1) Granting 
19 The researchers see university administration as a shell that protects the university 
core, that is, the academic community. “The shell mobilizes and distributes re-
sources that support the work of the guilds, and it protects the guilds from harmful 
external forces. The shell manages the interactions between guilds. Most impor-
tantly, the shell manages the university’s money and creates the incentives that 
motivate guild behavior” (Lombardi 2001: 7).
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public status to state-run universities, or (2) delegating 
the authority to govern the university to the faculty, or (3) 
privatizing the university management, that is, contracting 
university management out to a management team on the basis 
of a competitive selection are the solutions suggested by various 
stakeholders. 
While few policy makers and some faculty members advocate 
that the authority to govern university should be given to 
the faculty, very few administrators hold that contracting the 
university management out to a management team for a certain 
period of time enhance university autonomy and performance. 
However, the most advocated and popular option is to a 
grant public status to state-run universities, that is, making 
the universities independent of government. In fact, all these 
options are familiar to the stakeholders for these options 
have been implemented in Mongolia with varying degree of 
successes since the 1990s. Thus, groups with their vested interest 
and understandable biases have emerged: faculty members 
favor the faculty governance of the university while university 
administrators lean toward the privatization of the management 
of the university. Furthermore, except the privatization of the 
management of the university, a somewhat unconventional and 
transitory approach, the other two options are widely practiced 
in some of developed countries, faculty governance being most 
prominent in Japanese universities, while public boards being 
predominant in North America. 
Therefore, all three options deserve due treatments. First, I 
will consider the privatization of management options. The 
privatization of management or contracting the management 
of the university out to a management team on a competitive 
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basis is one of the approaches of both decentralization and 
privatization. It is basically aimed at making the university 
under question self-sufficient. Thus for the contract period the 
team enjoys the autonomy in its management of the institution 
as long as the team meets the conditions of the contract. Thus, 
in implication, the option temporarily guarantees the autonomy 
of the university management. However, the autonomy of the 
management of the university does not guarantee the autonomy 
of the university. Instead, there is a possibility that the university 
become dependent on the management team and its patronage. 
Furthermore, it is very likely, at least in theory, that the 
university will loose its public funding for this method aims at 
enhancing institutional self-sufficiency. In addition, it is a kind 
of provisional method which basically leads to privatization of 
the university under consideration. 
It is very likely that the option will have very small room for 
faculty participation in the university wide governance because 
it is the managerial team who bears the ultimate responsibility 
for the management of the university. Thus, this option might 
be weak in ensuring transparency and accountability; however 
it is dependent on the conditions stipulated at the contract. Since 
the conditions of the contract will serve as the benchmark of 
measurement of the management team, the team is very likely 
to channel its effort to meet the conditions of the contract. 
Finally, the feasibility of the method is very narrow. The option 
has been used to some higher education institutions in early 
1990s when government was forced to make the institutions 
self-sufficient in order to reduce its fiscal burden. However, the 
government never seriously put forward a proposal to privatize 
the managements of the major universities like the National 
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University of Mongolia, Mongolian University of Science and 
Technology etc. because the government and the public consider 
these universities as national assets and achievements. Thus, it 
is very unlikely that the government, which becoming stronger 
in fiscal terms, will consider the possibilities of contracting these 
institutions out to a management team. Furthermore, it is certain 
that the major opposition to this idea will come from the faculty 
members of the universities. The faculty members who aim to 
increase faculty participation in the university wide governance 
squarely oppose this idea. The most of the faculty members 
interviewed are very critical about this idea and they think that 
university will fall under the influence of business and political 
clique and be forced to serve to their interest. They see the 
idea as a pretext of some interest groups who aim at taking the 
universities over.       
Instead faculty members see themselves as the most determined 
guardians of the university interest on the ground that they 
have committed their life to academia. They argue that it is in 
their interest that the university perform well and be able to 
pursue preeminence; that is, to be able to gather the best minds 
of the nation and create most friendly to academia environment. 
Furthermore, faculty members believe that their participation 
in the university governance will enhance the transparency, 
accountability, and responsiveness of the university governance. 
Some politicians, disappointed with current board performance, 
see this idea as feasible. Thus, they propose that faculty 
participation in the university governance must be increased 
in decision making level. The most extreme position advocates 
faculty full control of university, that is, faculty members elect 
all the university administrators and keep them accountable.  
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In fact, faculty control of university is a well known practice. 
However, most experts in the field are critical about the idea 
of electing all the university administrators by the faculty, 
although they agree that “faculty should hold a substantive 
role in decision-making, and the most visible vehicle for faculty 
involvement is typically a faculty senate or some similar body 
with a different name (Tierney and Minor, 2003: 1). Thus the 
question is to what extent faculty should participate in the 
governance of the university and how to operationalize faculty 
participation in university wide decision making. 
Critics of faculty governance argue that faculty members “tend 
to resist strong, visionary leadership and firmly defend their 
personal status quo.” (Duderstadt 2004: 144) They see that 
this option tends produce the most ineffective administration 
because faculty members tend to select a leadership that does 
not threaten their status-quo. Furthermore, faculty members lack 
the necessary knowledge of university wide affairs, know little 
about how university really works and tend to mind their own 
immediate departmental needs most instead of university wide 
concern, argue experts and university administrators alike. 
Critics also suggest that excessive voting will lead to 
politicization of the faculty, a something that contradicts to 
meritocracy guided by the principle of competitive excellence, 
a must be fundamental principle of academia. Furthermore, 
internal politicization will necessarily introduce partisan politics 
into university wall which will erode the university autonomy. 
Another, possible drawback of the faculty control of the 
university is its tendency to weaken the university outward 
accountability. Faculty control of university may lead that 
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the university to become a self serving body, that is, serving 
the interest of the faculty members but not that of the public 
at large to which the university intended to serve. Thus, full 
faculty control of the university is not likely to ensure university 
autonomy and outward accountability, though it will enhance 
its inward transparency and accountability. 
Finally, the most advocated option is granting of public status 
to state-run universities. A public status is understood as 
the situation where the institution enjoys the condition of 
being entirely independent of all political and other sectarian 
influences and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its 
governing boards and in the administration of its own affairs 
and be entitled to public/governmental funding in fulfilling 
its mission. And Mongolian standard has been set by the 
Mongolian National Public Radio and Television that has been 
declared, by special law, as an independent of political and 
other influences public institution to serve for the public and 
owned by the public and same time entitled to public subsidy 
(Law of Public Radio and Television, article 21). Thanks to 
its public status, political electives and appointees, leaders of 
political parties, and government officials etc. are barred to 
be nominated to the governing board of the public radio and 
television that exercises all the authorities of typical governing 
boards including the authority to select the executive (Law of 
Public Radio and Television, article 21). 
This, in fact, is the option that has partially been introduced 
into Mongolian higher education since the 1990s and, indeed, 
governing board is the institution that ensures the public status 
of the university that majority of the stakeholders wants to have 
in Mongolia. However, as it has been discussed earlier, because 
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of some serious oversights on the side of the adopters and, 
subsequent, policy inconsistency the system has basically been 
deformed and negated.   
In fact, governing boards (known as board of trustees, board 
of regents, and board of governors) are inherently public 
institutions; they represent the public; they serve for the public 
in the name of the public. That is why they are commonly 
known as board of trustees, because trustees are the people who 
have been trusted by the public to oversee and protect their 
property. Boards of trustees are to ensure public ownership 
and oversight of a given institution. That is the meaning of the 
phrase that says, “UCLA is owned by the people of California, 
all 38 million of them” (for University of California is governed 
by 18 regents who represent the people of California). 
And public boards are to ensure university autonomy; they 
shield university from political and other sectarian influences, 
and they make sure that the university serves to the public as a 
whole, because public boards represent the public as a whole but 
not its parts nor its government. This is the most crucial reason 
of instituting public boards. In fact, in all democracies partisan 
politics is ardently pursued and governments are always 
controlled by party or rather parties that represent a chunk of 
the public not the whole people ever. But universities, or any 
public institutions, are to serve the whole people of the country. 
Thus, one of the central questions of all democracies “has been 
to what extent it is either desirable or possible to insulate any 
public institution from the influence of party politics” (Trow 
1998: 267). For this end governing public boards has been 
instituted. 
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Another important rationale of instituting public board is to 
ensure that the university serves to the public, that is, board 
keeps the university accountable to the public thus safeguards 
public interest by curtailing the possibility that the university 
becomes a self-serving body. 
Yet, the principal mission of university is to create and 
disseminate knowledge and it always involves questioning of 
existing orthodoxy. “In this tradition, knowledge is the evolving 
critical consensus of a decentralized community of “checkers,” 
who adhere to the principle that knowledge claims must be 
capable of being checked and withstand checking, regardless 
of the source of the claim of the identity of the checker. … In 
virtue of the academic profession’s special competence in the 
community of checkers – including knowledge of the existing 
scholarship and mastery of the techniques of investigation and 
validation in the disciplines – the profession has sought unique 
conditions of employment that protect a professor’s right to 
offend employers (and other powerful interests who influence 
employers) in pursuit of knowledge. Challenging existing 
orthodoxy has always posed risks in employment settings. 
Academic freedom describes these conditions of employment, 
whereby college and university employers, acknowledging 
higher education’s unique mission of creating knowledge and 
teaching the discipline of dissent, have granted exceptional 
vocational freedom of speech to professors in research, teaching, 
and extramural utterance without lay interference” (Hamilton 
2004: 95-6).
Therefore, faculty participation in university governance is 
essential. And, it has widely been recognized that “faculty peer 
collegium, exercising its peer-review responsibility, should 
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have primary authority over core academic issues including 
standards for admitting students; curriculum; procedures of 
student instruction; standards of student competence and ethical 
conduct; maintenance of a suitable environment for learning; 
the standards of faculty competence and ethical conduct; and 
the application of those standards in faculty appointments, 
promotions, tenure, and discipline (Hamilton 2004: 96-7)”. In 
fact, faculty peer-review is the linchpin of academic freedom 
and the guarantee of meritocracy, the paramount principle of 
academia. 
Furthermore, the needs and objectives of faculty, students, and 
the worlds of education and scholarship must be represented 
in other areas of university decision making for those decisions 
invariably affect the academic matters of the university20. In 
fact, the tradition of shared governance, the best practice of 
university governance widely practiced in North America, 
rests on the assumption that faculty should hold a substantive 
role in decision-making, and the most important institution for 
faculty participation in governance is typically a faculty senate 
or some similar body with a different name. And the role of the 
faculty senate is “to react to initiatives of administrative officers: 
to reject them when they seem at odds with academic values 
or procedures, to improve and refine them, and ultimately to 
legitimate administrative decisions and actions for the whole 
body of academics who can then believe that their interests 
and values are being protected (Trow 1998: 272)”. Thus, faculty 
senate is the key institution of faculty involvement in university 
governance. 
20 To determine the degree of faculty involvement in decision making at the system 
level, the shared governance tradition asks first what is the mission or core iden-
tity of the system. If the system mission emphasizes knowledge creation, then the 
faculty’s consulting role is critical to realize the mission (Hamilton 2004: 99)  
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In fact, public board together with faculty senate makes up the 
bicameral or shared governance structure of university. While 
the board represents the public, that is external, interests, the 
faculty senate represents the needs and objectives of faculty, 
students, and the worlds of education and scholarship to the 
university governance. Therefore, the administration has to be 
accountable not only to the board but also to the faculty. Thus, 
shared governance model ensures not only university autonomy, 
and faculty participation but also academic freedom. 
Therefore, instituting or rather re-instituting once introduced 
shared governance system, that is, on the one hand, making 
the university board public and governing institution, and 
separating the academic council from the administration and 
granting it the necessary authority, on the other hand, is the 
best option to address the problems plagued Mongolian state-
run university governance. The shared governance system will 
certainly enhance the university autonomy and transparency. 
Furthermore, this option will produce more capable and more 
accountable and transparent administration to universities 
for the system will, on the one hand, shield the university 
administration from political contingencies, and put the 
administration under public and faculty scrutiny, on the other 
hand. In fact, this tradition is the best proven practice that yields 
the most preeminent of universities of the world.   
Furthermore, re-instituting or strengthening shared governance 
system is the most feasible option. For this option has been 
advocated by the most stakeholders, it is very probable that 
it will win their support. The country’s political and socio-
economic orientation favors this option. Indeed, if this nation 
really wants to be a community of freedom and liberty then 
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its universities must be free of any political and sectarian 
influences. In addition, the legal environment of the country, 
except few changes and amendments in relevant laws, is friendly 
to the proposed option because the basic idea of this system has 
already been legalized. Thus, what this paper really suggests is 
to transform the university governance profoundly by making 
incremental legal and procedural changes. 
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CoNClUSioN 
With the decentralization of its higher education system, Mongolia aimed at making its higher education 
institutions autonomous and self-sufficient. The policy option 
that was taken to make state-run universities autonomous was 
the adoption of the shared governance system similar to and 
inspired from that of United States of America and Canada. 
However, because of some initial oversights the adopted 
system did not bring the expected outcome. Frustrated with 
the system’s deficiency, the subsequent policy makers, instead 
of rectifying the initial mistakes, partially reversed the adopted 
system by relegating university governing board’s authority to 
select the president of a university to the government. 
As a result, the state-run universities did not achieve any 
autonomy. Instead, state-run universities have been put under 
dual control of government (by implication partisan politics) 
in the face of the minister of education who appoint and 
dismiss the president of university and the quasi-governmental 
governing board that review the university administration. In 
addition, faculty participation in university governance and its 
institutions, the other part of the shared governance system and 
the custodian of academic freedom and autonomy of academic 
community, have been left underdeveloped and indeed the 
relevant legislation inhibited its further development. 
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Furthermore, because of the virtual negation of university 
governing board and the serious deformation of academic 
council, there has been created a power vacuum on both sides of 
the university administration (power devolution). This creates 
the situation where the university senior administrators, who, 
in their turn, have been forced to seek a political patronage, 
replace the university governing board and academic council, 
and run the university without genuine accountability (power 
concentration). This situation yields a politically susceptible 
thus incompetent to depend the university interest, yet opaque 
administration where cronyism and arbitrariness can flourish.    
All the direct stakeholders are aware of this situation, yet with 
a varying degree of understanding. Thus they suggest changing 
the system by way of (1) granting public statuses to state-run 
universities by special law, or (2) granting a complete control of 
university to faculty members or (3) contracting out university 
administration to a management team on a competitive basis. 
However, the evaluation of the options shows that neither 
the faculty complete control of university nor the contracting 
out of university administration is conducive to address the 
problems. Although both options offer some advantages over 
the existing situation, they do not guarantee the autonomy 
and accountability of the university. The faculty full control of 
university is likely to yield an ineffective and irresponsible, yet 
politicized administration (and academic community) that will 
necessarily tie the university to partisan politics, thus weaken 
the university autonomy. However, faculty participation in the 
university governance has to be increased but not to the level 
of faculty complete control of university. The privatization of 
management option may provide temporary autonomy for 
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the university administration as long as the team meets the 
conditions of the contract. But the autonomy of the university 
administration does not necessarily mean the autonomy of the 
university because the option is very weak in accommodating 
faculty participation in the university governance. Furthermore, 
the university will largely become out of public reach. Thus, 
there is a possibility that the university become dependent on 
the clique who won the competition. Then, the whole option 
is a kind of provisional measure aimed at privatization of the 
university because the main rationale of using this method is 
to make the university self-sufficient. Finally, both options are 
politically not feasible.
The option of granting of a public status to a university offers 
better guarantee for university autonomy. Yet, if we limit the 
option only as a method of granting public status to university 
governing board thus making it independent of political and 
other sectarian influence, it will partially solve only one part 
of the problem, the problem of autonomy. However, if we aim 
to further enhance the autonomy of the university and make 
the university administration transparent and accountable we 
have to develop faculty participation in university governance. 
Especially, we have to develop existing academic councils 
in order to make them “the central educational forum” 
independent of university administration and grant them with 
the full authority over the academic matter and consultative and 
advisory authority over any matter of interest to the university. 
Otherwise, the best solution to the problems that plaque the 
governance of the Mongolian state-run universities is to re-
institute the once introduced shared governance system with its 
proper institutions, authorities, and procedures. 
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reCCoMMeNDAtioNS 
The Board:
1. The board should be made public, that is, its members 
should come from the public at large. Neither the political 
electives and appointees nor the governmental officials should 
be members of the board. It should be made clear that politics 
and patronage have no place in the governance of public 
institution, but meritocracy. However, there can be few ex officio 
members at the board that hold relevant to higher education 
offices. The number of the ex officio members should be less 
than the quarter of the board. Furthermore, the meetings of the 
governing board must be public21. 
2. The board should be given the authority to appoint and 
dismiss the university president, (possibly vice-presidents upon 
the president’s proposal)22. 
3. The board has to be sufficiently institutionalized in order 
to effectively and efficiently carry out its duties. The rule of 
board continuity and the change should be strictly adhered and 
enforced. The board should have executive and other standing 
committees responsible for specific institutional functions 
21 Proper legislation might be desirable, yet it is not necessary within the existing 
educational law. 
22 There is a need to repeal the 2002 changes (Educational Law, articles 28.1.12; 
28.1.19; 28.2) to the educational law and re-institute the 1998 (Educational Law, 
article 30.6.1; Higher Educational Law, article 13.2) changes.
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(finance, audit, grounds and buildings, investments human 
resources etc.). It might be advisable that the board has its own 
budget and office. However, board members should not receive 
any salary or compensation for their service. 
4. A procedure (including the criteria that the future 
board members should meet) that guarantees independent 
and transparent selection of board members has to be 
developed and clearly spelled out. It is necessary to establish 
an independent search committee to identify potential board 
members. Furthermore, it might be advisable to include some 
representatives from the Academic Council of the given 
university in the search committee. 
5. The institution that finally appoints the board members 
has to be an institution (or institutions) that does not easily yield 
to political and other influences. The appointment of the board 
members by the president of the country with the approval of 
the parliament might be one possible solution. 
6. An adequate institutional culture has to be developed and 
fostered. Board website, manual, schedule, statement of conflict 
of interest, and other means of communication and continuing 
education of board members are of great use here.
The Academic Council:
1. The Academic Council should be a faculty body 
independent of university administration. It should have its 
own deliberative/legislative body elected from among the 
faculty members who represent the university’s significant parts 
proportionally. The Academic Council should adopt its own 
bylaw subject to governing board’s approval23. 
23  Relevant legislation has to be changed (Higher Educational Law, article 11.4-5). 
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2. The Academic Council should be granted with the 
authority to make decisions over academic matters like 
student admissions, faculty hiring and promotion, curriculum 
development, and awarding degrees. The Academic Council 
should select the faculty members who represent the faculty 
at the university governing board. In addition, the Academic 
Council should exercise consultative and advisory authority 
over any matter of interest to the university including the 
selection of the president and vice-presidents, budget, and 
planning of the university. 
3. The Academic Council should be sufficiently 
institutionalized to effectively and efficiently carry out its 
duties. The Academic Council should have executive and 
other standing committees (finance and facility, planning and 
budget, academic freedom, academic personnel, educational 
and research policy, faculty compensation and benefit etc.). It is 
necessary the Academic Council has its own budget and office. 
However, council members should not receive any salary or 
compensation for their service. 
4. An adequate institutional culture has to be developed 
and fostered. Academic Council website, manual, schedule, 
statement of conflict of interest, and other mediums of 
communication and continuing education of council members 
are of great use here.
5. Other school and faculty level faculty committees 
over the matter of student admissions, faculty hiring and 
promotion, curriculum development, and awarding degrees 
should be established and their authorities and duties should be 
coordinated with the Academic Council.
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The Administration:
1. In order to ensure accountability (and academic freedom) 
at mid and lower level it might be advisable to fully devolve 
the authority to propose (if not to appoint) the chairs of the 
departments to respective school deans. 
2. The administration should develop a statement of conflict 
of interest and strictly enforce it. 
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